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THE EUROPEAN UNION INTERNET 
COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE AS EVEN MORE 
THAN IT ENVISIONS: TOWARD A SUPRA-
ED HARMONIZATION OF COPYRIGHT 
POLICY AND THEORY 
MoNICA E. ANTEZANA* 
Abstract: Evolving global markets in electronic commerce highlight the 
importance of developing a copyright regime capable of flowing with the 
changing landscape of international intellectual property law. Traditional 
boundaries based on time and distance erode as business, education, and the 
world at large become more digitized. In order to respond to the increas-
ingly widespread digital age, copyright law must become less nationalistic 
and more global in scale. Both the United States and the European Union 
have acknowledged the dynamics of intellectual property in today's digital 
revolution. The United States has responded with, among others, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act, and the European Union has similarly answered with its Directives 
on Copyright and £-Commerce. Historically, the United States, in contrast 
with the European Union, has shown reluctance to recognize moral rights as 
an important aspect of copyright law. Going forward, it is in the interest of 
both trading entities to work together to create a more harmonized market 
that will be better suited to international business in the 21st century. 
INTRODUCTION 
International copyright law and its related issues and limitations, 
which were formerly more conceptual theory than legal practicality, 
have become increasingly concrete as technology and the internet 
have created substantial global markets in electronic commerce (e-
commerce). In June 2000, a panel of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WT0) 1 issued the first opin-
* Monica E. Antezana is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. She dedicates this note to her father, Fernando Antezana. 
1 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF TilE URUGUAY RoUND vol. 1 
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
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ion (panel report)2 in its history on an alleged violation of the copy-
right provisions contained in the Agreement of Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement).3 Although 
significant international copyright agreements have existed for well 
over a century,4 until recently no dispute regarding member state 
compliance had ever been submitted to a formal dispute settlement 
process,5 much less one supported by effective mechanisms of en-
forcement. Even so, after adoption by the full DSB of the panel re-
port6 which found a recent amendment of Section 110(5) of the 
United States Copyright Act7 to be in violation of U.S. obligations un-
der the TRIPS Agreement, the United States is now obliged to amend 
its copyright law or to face damages or trade sanctions for its violation 
of the TRIPS Agreement.8 It follows that with such enforcement 
2 Such a panel report is distributed to all Members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (after being preliminarily reviewed by the disputing parties) for adoption by the 
full Dispute Settlement Body, an entity comprised of representatives from all member 
states. The panel report is adopted unless there is a consensus specifically not to do so. See 
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16(4). Note that this reverses the prior equivalent 
procedure under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under this pro-
cedure, reports required a consensus before they could be adopted. The effect of this 
change was to go from a system where the losing party could block adoption of the report 
to a system in which adoption of the report is presumed absent clear consensus intention 
to the contrary. For general background and a more complete discussion of this process, 
see David Palmeter, National Sovereignty and the World Trade Organization, 2 J. WoRLD INTELL. 
PROP. 77, 78-81 (1999). 
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS--REsuLTS OF TilE URUGUAY ROUND voi. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [here-
inafter TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS Agreement is one part of the trade agreement es-
tablishing the WTO coming from the Uruguay Round Revision of the General Agreement 
of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], and 
it includes provisions on all aspects of intellectual property including copyright. See gener-
ally ].H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the 
TRIPS Component of the WTOAgreement, 29 INT'L LAw. 345 (1995) (providing an overview of 
the TRIPS Agreement). 
4 See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of the Berne Con-
vention). 
5 See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (discussing Article 33 of the Berne 
Convention). 
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the Panel Report and a thorough analysis of its 
implications, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International 
Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. LJ. 733, 748-77 (2001 ). 
7 See Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2830-31 (1998) 
(codified primarily at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (1976); §§ 101, 504, 512 (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998)). 
8 The United States elected not to appeal the panel finding, and an arbitrator under 
Article 21 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding gave the United States until July 21, 
2001 to bring itself into compliance with TRIPS. The United States has further indicated 
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mechanisms in place, and with the DSB willing to challenge the na-
tional procedures of individual countries, the United States and the 
European Union (EU), two major worldwide trading entities, will find 
it increasingly necessary to achieve accord not only in the burgeoning 
area of e-commerce but also in intellectual property law in general. 
The United States made its first such attempts with its 1998 Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) ,9 the Uniform Computer In-
formation Transactions Act (UCITA) ,10 and the proposed Collections 
oflnformation Antipiracy Act (CIAA). 11 The EU has followed with its 
Directives on Copyright12 and E-Commerce,13 two directives intended 
to progress further toward harmonization of intellectual property laws 
throughout the EU.14 Eventually, such directives and their accord with 
the EU's major trading partners could lead to harmonization at a 
global level-an increasingly important goal in today's digital age.l5 
Indeed, "[c]ultural assimilation and the ability of digitized works to 
evade national regulation make it significantly more likely that mod-
ern copyright litigation will en tail analysis of different national laws. "16 
Copyright law must give way to this digital revolution and, in do-
ing so, become less nationalistic and more global in its scale. This 
note explores the history of copyright law in Europe and in the 
United States, providing emphasis on the evolution of the moral 
to \\'TO members that it intends to comply with the panel report and make the necessary 
amendments to U.S. law. See vVTO, Award of the Arbitrator, United States-Section 110(5) 
of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/12 (jan. 15, 2001), available at http:/ /www.wto. 
org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/160_12_e.pdf. For more on the U.S. response to the panel 
report, see Dinwoodie, supra note 6, at 762-64; sec also U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 110(5) (1976). 
9 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (1998). 
10 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) (Final Version, Aug. 23, 
2001), available at http:/ /www.ucitaonline.com/ucita.html. UCITA was "[d) rafted by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and ... approved and 
recommended for enactment ... "at its 1999 Annual Conference in Denver, Colorado. !d. 
Cmrently, only Maryland and Virginia have adopted UCITA. UCITA Online, Status of 
UCITA in the States (Apr. 6, 2001), at http:/ /www.ucitaonline.com/slhpsus.html. 
11 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (CIAA), H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999). 
1 ~ Council Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copy-
right and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 OJ. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter 
Copyright Directive]. 
13 Council Directh·e 2003/31/EC on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society 
Sen·ices, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 OJ. (L 178) 1 
[hereinafter £-Commerce Directive]. 
14 Sec id.; Copyright Directh·e, supm note 12, at art. 1. 
15 Sec Jacqueline Lipton, Copyright in tltc Digital Age: A Comparative Survey, 27 RuTGERS 
CoMI'UTER & Tn~u. LJ. 333,368-69 (2001). 
16 Dinwoodie, supra note 6, at 777. 
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rights doctrine in the United States as compared with Europe. It also 
addresses the impact of the internet and e-commerce on the tradi-
tional conceptions and mechanisms of copyright law. Finally, this note 
concludes that if the EU and the United States are to remain promi-
nent world trading partners and primary producers of copyrighted 
material to each other and to the rest of the world, the digital revolu-
tion necessitates not only increased harmonization of copyright law 
throughout the EU, but also between the EU and the United States. It 
is this movement toward harmonization that will necessitate greater 
U.S. recognition of the moral rights doctrine. Through such recogni-
tion, the EU and the United States will enjoy a state of heightened 
copyright policy congruity within which both world powers can oper-
ate. 
I. THE BERNE CoNVENTION AS AN EARLY AND ONGOING ATTEMPT TO 
GLOBALIZE CoPYRIGHT LAw 
A. The EaTly Days of the Berne Convention as a Mechanism to Safeguard 
Both Moral Rights and Economic Interests in Copylight 
International copyright relations seriously commenced in 1886 
with the conclusion of the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) .17 Conn tries partici-
pating in the dialogue leading to the Berne Convention sought copy-
right protection outside national borders for the works of their own 
citizens.l8 Such an objective could have been achieved in a few differ-
ent ways. Several countries supported a comprehensive universal 
copyright law that would have established uniform standards to be 
applied in all adherent countries.19 However, such a strict, demanding 
approach was eventually deemed too much of a potential obstacle to 
the overall growth of the Berne Union.20 
17 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
25 U.S.T. 1341,828 U.N.T.S. 221(as last revisited July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Con-
vention]. 
18 See Dinwoodie, supra note 6, at 737. 
19 See id. Germany was one of the strongest advocates of uniform standards. !d. (citing 
Jane C. Ginsburg, The Role of National Copyright in an Era of International Copyright, in Tm: 
RoLE OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION IN COPYRIGHT LAW 211, 213 (Deitz ed., 2000)) (discuss-
ing generally the events leading up to the Berne Convention). 
20 Dinwoodie, supra note 6, at 738. Dinwoodie notes that even as early in copyright his-
tory as the late nineteenth century, the copyright laws of several European countries were 
adequately developed to highlight the differences among countries. ld. at 737. Attempting 
to achieve uniform standards would have been even more difficult in such areas where 
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This being the case, the text of the 1886 Berne Convention 
sought broader international copyright protection through the prin-
ciple of national treatment-a provision in the Berne Convention that 
essentially served as the "equal protection clause of international 
copyright law."21 The national treatment provision required that 
member countries provide nationals of other member countries, or 
works first published in other member countries, with copyright pro-
tection at least equivalent to that offered to their own citizens and 
works.22 This approach obliged member parties to agree to a set of 
"minimum standards of copyright protection" that were neither as 
stringent nor as comprehensive as those proposed by advocates of 
uniform standards.23 The Berne Convention minimum standards set 
forth a required level of copyright protection for member states, but 
they did not prevent countries from providing more extensive protec-
tion to cop}Tight holders and copyrighted works within their bor-
ders.24 The Berne Convention was revised five times over the next 
century, but the basic structure of national treatment plus minimum 
standards was preserved.25 
The current text of the Berne Convention, the text with which 
the United States complied in 1988, is the Paris Act of 1971.26 The 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) manages the Berne 
Convention.27 A "specialized agency" within the United Nations, 
\VIPO researches, designs, and provides services to ensure worldwide 
intellectual property protection.28 The WIPO Director General and 
staff supervise the "Berne Union," an entity comprised of "Member 
States" that was established by the Berne Convention.29 
"divergent national jurisprudence had already taken root." I d. Accordingly, rigid uniform 
standards such as those advocated by Germany would more likely act as a deterrent to 
Berne adherence rather than as the intended vehicle to encourage intellectual property 
harmonization. Id. at 737-38. 
2! See id. at 738. 
22 See id. 
2s See id. at 739. 
24 See id. 
25 See Report Accompanying the Berne Convention Implementation Act, H.R. REP. 
No. 100-609, at 11-13 (1988) (summarizing the revisions and completions of the Berne 
C01wention). The Berne Convention was re,·ised in Berlin in 1908, in Rome in 1925, in 
Brussels in 1948, in Stockholm in 1967, and in Paris in 1971. Id. 
26 See CRAIG jOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 35 (5th ed. 2001). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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The First Article of the Paris Act reads: "(t)he countries to which 
this Convention applies constitute a Union for the protection of the 
rights of authors in their literary and artistic works. "30 By explicitly 
and immediately addressing the protection of authors' rights in this 
way, the language of the treaty connects the Berne Union with that 
conception of copyright primarily based on "authors' rights," as op-
posed to the economic or utilitarian approach to copyright protection 
(to which the United States primarily adheres).31 Generally, the aspi-
ration to harmonize the protection of artistic, intellectual property 
throughout the world has propelled the evolution and actions of the 
Berne Union since its inception.32 
Following this First Article of the Paris Act, the next twenty arti-
cles comprise the Berne Convention's substantive provisions which set 
forth both specific and general obligations compelled by membership 
within the Berne Union.33 The remaining rules are elective and thus 
may be, but are not required to be, adopted by member countries.34 
Administrative provisions and an appendix that includes "special pro-
visions for developing countries" follow the substantive provisions.35 
The Convention relies on national compliance with "Convention 
minima," obligations that generally are considered quite arduous in 
terms of intellectual property treatment, especially by U.S. stan-
dards.36 Specifically, the Berne Convention's emphasis on "moral 
rights" as the primary justification for copyright law seems to clash 
with the traditional, economically-based U.S. approach.37 
110 Seeid. (citing Berne Convention). 
~1 See joYcE, supra note 26, at 35. 
32 See id. (citing SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CoNVENTION FOR TilE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTisTic WoRKs: 1886-1986, at 151-52 (1987)). Note the use of the word 
"union" to connote the group of member states that has signed on to the Berne Conven-
tion. !d. at 35, n.48. It has been suggested that this usage was intended to perform a "sym-
bolic function" beyond simply the narrow meaning within international law as a group of 
member states. "It can be seen as embodying the ultimate ideal of universal codification-
an international regime under which authors are protected uniformly everywhere 
throughout the territory of the Union. It this ideal now seems obsolete, or even danger-
ously out of touch with modern realities, it should be recalled that the protection of the 
Berne Convention has been steadily enhanced over the first century of its existence, and 
that it does presently embody a limited international codification of the law relating to 
authors' rights." !d. 
3~ !d. at 35. 
'!Afd. 
55 Id. 
36 joYCE, supra note 26, at 35-38. 
~7 See id. at 37. 
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B. The Berne Convention and the Principle of Moral Rights as the Driving 
Force Behind Copyright Law 
The nonextensive text of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention 
addresses "moral rights. "38 The Berne Convention requires that cer-
tain "moral rights" be recognized "[i]ndependently of the author's 
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights. "39 Arti-
cle 6 requires that all signatories protect authors' and artists' moral 
rights in their domestic laws. 40 Article 6bis (I) provides that: "[T] he 
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to ob-
ject to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be preju-
dicial to his honor or reputation. "41 Article 6bis(2) mandates that 
these rights last at least until the economic rights end.42 It is here that 
the Berne Convention legitimizes the recognition of a general "droit 
momf' or "moral right" that conceives of an author's work as much 
more than a simple economic, profit-making tool.43 In fact, such a 
moral right (in contrast with simple economic interests) is "inalien-
able," and a "natural right" that arises from the idea of the work "as an 
extension of the author's personality. "44 Indeed, in the civil law coun-
tries of Europe, copyright protection schemes developed initially from 
a natural law philosophy.45 
The civil law tradition considers copyright an extension of the 
author's or creator's personality.46 As Professor Roberta Kwall writes, 
"[m]oral rights, or rights which protect the personal interests of all 
authors, safeguard the dignity, self-worth, and autonomy of the 
author."47 Accordingly, only individuals can be "creators;" companies 
and organizations per se cannot be "creators" because they lack the 
(essential) "person" in "personality."48 
38 Peter Jaszi, International Copyright from Basics to Current Issues, in ADVANCED SEMINAR 
oN CoPYRIGHT LAw 2001 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, 
Handbook Series, 2001), available at653 PLI/PAT 301, 327 (2001). 
sg See Berne Convention, supm note 17, art. 6bis ( 1). 
40 See id. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. art. 6bis(2). 
4S JoYCE, supra note 26, at 625. 
44 /d. 
45 See Irene Segal Ayers, The Future of Global Copyright Protection: Has Copyright Law Gone 
TooFar7, 62 U. l'nT. L. REv. 49, 65 (2000). 
46 Lipton, supm note 15, at 335. 
47 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories:" Narrative's Implication for Moral Rights and 
Copy1ight'sjoint A.utlwrshipDoctriiiC, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 5 (2001). 
48 Lipton, supra note 15, at 335. 
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The basis for copyright protection is recognition of, and regard 
for, individual achievements of creation or production.49 Therefore, 
protection exceeds mere economic rights or interest in the monetary 
value of the work product.50 Indeed, "copyright law is about more 
than trade. It reflects values of personality and authorial integrity, and 
a balance of private rights and public access, that a trade equation 
might obscure. "51 At least the civil law tradition supported these val-
ues; accordingly, protection in such countries extends to "moral 
rights" such as the right to be identified as the creator of a work and 
the right to have the integrity of that work maintained and pre-
served.52 
Such works are not simple commodities, but rather enjoy synon-
ymy with the creator's identity.53 Copyright theory, recognizing 
authorial importance in this way, is thus sharply prejudiced in favor of 
the author and stands, with only a few narrow exceptions, for strong 
copyright protection for authors.54 It is this concept of "moral rights" 
that the United States has hesitated to incorporate into its own copy-
right laws. 55 
The extent of the definition of moral rights differs among coun-
tries. 56 Generally, the formulation of moral rights is made up of sev-
eral similar and overlapping parts.57 Most consider an author's moral 
rights to include: 
1) the right of integrity: the right to insist that a work not be 
mutilated or distorted; 2) the right of attribution: the right to 
be acknowledged as the author of a work and to prevent 
others from naming anyone else as the creator; and 3) the 
right of disclosure: the right to decide when and in what form 
the work will be presented to the public.58 
In fewer cases, moral rights include the right of withdrawal (the right 
to control the fate of all distributed copies) and the right to stop "ex-
cessive criticism" (this is based on the idea that criticism of the work 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 Dinwoodie, supra note 6, at 766. 
52 See id. 
53 JoYCE, supra note 26, at 65. 
54 See Ayers, supra note 45, at 65. 
55 JoYcE, supra note 26, at 37. 
56 !d. at 626. 
57 !d. 
58 !d. 
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amounts to criticism of the author, as the work is considered a simple 
extension of the author) .59 
C. Initial U.S. Rejitsa/ to Participate in the Berne Convention 
Until 1891, the United States lacked any "international copyright 
relations."60 In fact, during much of the nineteenth century, the 
United States was infamous as a "pirat[e]" nation-the best-selling 
literary works in America were unapproved, "piratical" copies of Brit-
ish works.61 However, as times changed, the U.S. publishing industry 
began to feel its own economic pressures.62 The uncontrolled copying 
of British books began to create increasingly debilitating competition 
and, thus, out of economic necessity, the United States started to shift 
its own laws toward regulations more closely resembling those found 
in Europe.63 
The Chace Act of 1891, an amendment to U.S. copyright law, 
gave the President authority to protect works originating in certain 
foreign countries, as long as those foreign countries furnished equiva-
lent protection to the works of American authors.64 This began a se-
ries of similar proclamations in which the United States joined into 
bilateral copyright agreements with other countries. 55 In each of these 
cases, the in1petus behind enacting such agreements was to protect 
the valuable and expanding market of literary and artistic works 
originating within the United States.66 
The United States increasingly seemed to be creating, in a 
"piecemeal" fashion, its own international copyTight laws by means of 
these bilateral agreements.67 However, eventually such discrete ar-
rangements made on a country-by-country basis became insufficient.68 
Newer, brighter, and faster ways of communication and dispersal cre-
ated a seemingly contracting universe of intellectual property; those 
regulations that once fit U.S. purposes both domestically and abroad 
59 !d. 
60 joYCE, supra note 26, at 33. 
61 !d. 
62 !d. 
63 !d. 
64 !d. at 33-34. The President could exert this authority "by proclamation." !d. 
65 Scc.JoYcE, supra note 26, at 34. 
66 Sec id. 
67 !d. 
68Jd. 
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became too simple as the world evolved into one of ever-heightening 
complexity.69 
As a reaction to these changing world conditions, beginning in 
1935 the U.S. Senate endeavored to ratify the Berne Convention, but 
rescinded ratification when it became obvious how drastically differ-
ent U.S. copyright policies were from those of the Berne Convention 
countries.7o In order for the United States to have signed on to the 
Berne Convention at that point, it would have had to change its laws 
substantially, specifically those laws regarding term of protection and 
copyright formalities. 71 In light of the fact that the U.S. approach to 
copyright matters focused on (and continues to focus on) providing 
authors merely with sufficient economic incentive to engage in crea-
tion, such changes were inimical to U.S. values at the time. 72 
By the early 1950s, the United States had begun to export in-
creasing numbers of copyrighted works, and thus it became critical 
for the United States to take part in a more comprehensive and 
unified system of international copyright.73 The "piecemeal" agree-
ments the United States had been entering into became glaringly in-
adequate for the task of protecting U.S. copyright interests world-
wide.74 In fact, the United States recognized its need for greater 
international participation but still felt the standards of the Berne 
Convention were too different from U.S. standards to justify Berne 
Convention ratification at the time.75 The Berne Convention concep-
tion of a "moral right" recognizes an author's continuing interest in 
his or her work.76 As such, the author may control certain uses of the 
work itself even after he or she has transferred economic rights to 
others-a concept squarely in conflict with traditional American 
copyright law, and thus a concept that veritably insured at the time 
that the United States would refuse to sign on to the Berne Conven-
tion.77 
In response to these developments, a group of countries con-
vened by the Copyright Law Division of the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) created the 
69 ld. 
70 JoYCE, supra note 26, at 34 n.45. 
71 !d. 
72 See id. at 34. 
73 !d. 
74 !d. 
75 See joYcE, supra note 26, at 34. 
76 !d. at 37. 
77 See id. 
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Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.) treaty between 1947 and 
1952.78 The purpose of UNESCO in developing this treaty was to draw 
hesitant countries into a worldwide copyright system-essentially a 
pseudo-Berne type of union.79 Indeed, UNESCO sought to entice 
such nations by setting forth U.C.C. standards thought to be less 
stringent than those of the Berne Convention,80 believing that more 
reluctant nations would be willing to ratifY the U.C.C. even while they 
were unwilling to ratifY Berne.81 Specifically, the U .C. C. distinguished 
itself from the Berne Convention by its lack of a provision on moral 
rights, an absence pointedly designed to draw the United States under 
the U.C.C. umbrella.82 In fact, the U.C.C. ultimately functioned as a 
stepping stone to the Berne Convention.83 The United States elected 
to sign on to the U .C. C. in 1955.84 
The United States Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act) represented 
both an overhaul of copyright legislation and also the first major 
change to U.S. copyright law since 1909.85 The 1976 Act began to 
bring U.S. law closer to some of the major standards of the Berne 
Convention.86 For example, the 1976 Act extended copyright term 
duration nineteen years-increasing the maximum term duration 
from fifty-six years to seventy-five years.87 In light of the fact that the 
(predominately European) moral rights conception seeks to expand 
and to extend authors' rights over their works, such a duration exten-
sion began to make U.S. law look a little more like European law.88 
The duration extension thus concomitantly made adhering to the 
Berne Convention minima slightly more palatable to the United 
States.89 The 1976 Act, however, still failed to constitute enough of a 
change in U.S. law through its implementation to further U.S. com-
patibility with Berne Convention standards.90 At the same time, and 
increasingly since the 1976 Act's implementation, the United States 
78 /d. at 34 n.45. 
79 /d. 
80 joYCE, supra note 26, at 34. 
81 /d. 
82 See Alexander A. Caviedes, International Copy1ight Law: Should the European Union Dic-
tateitsDevelopmentr, 16 B.U. INT'L LJ. 165,173 (1998). 
83JovcE, supra note 26, at 34. 
S4 /d. 
85 See id. at 21. 
86 See id. at 22-23. 
87 /d. at 23. 
88 See.JovcE, supra note 26, at 24. 
89 See id. at 23. 
90 /d. at 39. 
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began to move gradually toward a conception of copyright that at 
least minimally acknowledged authorial moral rights over works.91 In-
deed, given U.S. interest in protecting its intellectual property works 
abroad, eventual Berne Convention compatibility seemed to be a 
foregone conclusion.92 
The U.S. Congress began ostensibly to gravitate toward Berne 
Convention compliance in the late 1980s.93 In making this decision, 
Congress emphasized the worldwide value of U.S. intellectual prop-
erty and acknowledged that protecting this valuable commodity re-
quired moving toward compliance with international standards.94 
However, the fact remained that U.S. copyright law was (and still is) 
very different from the civil law approach in Europe.95 Accordingly, 
Congress took what has been considered a "minimalist" approach in 
amending U.S. copyright law.96 That is, Congress sought to amend 
U.S. law only as much as necessary to meet minimal Berne Conven-
tion obligations.97 
The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (Berne Con-
vention Implementation Act) amended prior U.S. law so as to bring it 
into compliance with Berne requirements.98 The amendments 
changed some technical rules with respect to notice, registration, and 
other formalities, but failed to adopt explicitly the Berne Convention 
approach to authorial moral rights.99 In fact, the United States signed 
on to the Berne Convention without actually adopting its Article 
6bis-the article that emphasizes the importance of an author's non-
transferable and eternal right in his or her work simply because of his 
or her role as creator of the work,too 
The Berne Convention allows member states flexibility in the 
implementation of its standards so that states may tailor their laws to 
fit with their own social mores, culture, and economic priorities. 101 
Historically, great deference has been shown to member states' own 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
95 See joYCE, supra note 26, at 38-39. 
94 !d. at 38-40; see also Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-568,102 Stat. 2853 (1988) [hereinafter Berne Convention Implementation Act]. 
95 See joYCE, supra note 26, at 39. 
96 !d. 
97 !d. 
98 !d. 
99 !d. at 41. 
IOO See joYCE, supra note 26, at 41; see also Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 6bis. 
1o1 SeeDinwoodie, supra note 6, at 740-41. 
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interpretations of what compliance with the Berne Convention re-
quires.102 Thus, the United States was able to adhere nominally to the 
Berne Convention in 1988 without offering any moral rights protec-
tion per se. Instead, it offered only a motley group of federal regula-
tions and state common laws that, according to the U.S. interpreta-
tion, combined to extend the requisite protection to moral rights.J03 
Indeed, the United States claimed that its law had "evolved" to 
the point that, taken as a whole, it could provide the minimal safe-
guards for artists' moral rights set forth in the Berne Convention.J04 
Congress further noted that even if U.S. law taken in totality still 
failed to provide this minimum protection, other member countries 
also were not in compliance and no objection had ever been made to 
their membership.1°5 While this may be true, the fact of the matter, as 
Professor Dinwoodie points out, is that U.S. success with its compli-
ance argument probably resulted more from the "deferential" ap-
proach taken toward member state compliance with Berne obliga-
tions than it did from a searching analysis of U.S. law.106 Moreover, 
even though Article 33 of the Berne Convention permitted the refer-
ral of compliance disputes involving the Convention to the Interna-
tional Court ofjustice,107 this mechanism had never been used.108 
While U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention in the late 1980s 
introduced limited changes to certain minutia of U.S. law, perhaps 
more notably it reflected subtle and not-so-subtle changes in the 
102 See id. at 741. 
103 /d. Dinwoodie notes that these state and federal causes of action "coincidentally" 
offered authors protection in circumstances similar to those in which a moral right claim 
might lie. /d. (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34) (listing the different causes of action 
upon which the U.S. argument of compliance was based). 
104 See Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Compara-
tive Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STIJD. 95, 97 ( 1997). 
105 /d. (citing RalphS. Brown, Adherence to the Berne Cofryright Convention: The Moral Right 
Issue, 35 .J. CoPYRIGIIT Soc'v 196, 205 (1987-88) ). 
106 Sec Dinwoodie, supra note 6, at 741. Further, "[i]t is the lack of effective compliance 
among Berne Countries, rather than the protection given moral rights in American law, 
that removes Article 6bis as an obstacle to U.S. adherence." Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights 
in the United States and Article 6bis of the Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report 
oftllC A.d Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 CoLUM.-VLAJ.L. & 
ARTs 655,655 (1986). 
107 Sec Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 33, art. 33(1). 
108 Sec J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 335, 339 n.17 ( 1997). No "state ever took such action, nor did any invoke the 
doctrine of retaliation and retorsion theoretically available under international law for 
violation of international minimum standards of intellectual property protection." /d. 
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American legal approach to copyright.l09 In fact, U.S. adherence to 
the Berne Convention slightly has begun to shift the U.S. conception 
of copyright from one based in pure economics to one more 
grounded in moral rights.ll0 Perhaps the civil law's author-centered 
tradition has begun to be absorbed into American legal culture.lll If 
this is so, then what began as an economic necessity may also have 
sown the seeds to create a cultural shift in American thinking.112 Such 
a shift could eventually push U.S. copyright law and, by extension, 
U.S. intellectual property law, closer to the ideal envisioned by the 
recent European Copyright Directive.ll3 
Such favorable movement toward harmonization, however, may 
be wholly illusory without actual federal law recognition of an 
author's moral rights in his or her creations.l 14 In the Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act,115 Congress specifically declined to imple-
ment Article 6bis on the ground that existing federal and state laws 
and common law roughly equaled the Article 6bis guarantees of the 
right of integrity and of attribution. 116 Of course, the Berne Conven-
tion's inclusion of, and emphasis on, moral rights required that the 
United States address the moral rights issue in order to comply (at 
least ostensibly) with Berne Convention standards. However, in light 
of U.S. reluctance to recognize moral rights and the U.S. minimalist 
approach to compliance with the Berne Convention, the reality is 
that, absent federal legislation providing for protection against the 
infringement of moral rights, the United States still fails copyright 
holders in its lack of an integrated approach to the protection of 
moral rights.ll7 
D. U.S. Copyright After the Berne Convention Implementation Act 
Before signing on to Berne on March 1, 1989, the United States 
was the only influential Western country not yet a Berne Convention 
signatory. us Between 1955, when the United States signed on to the 
109 See id. at 339. 
no See id. 
Ill SeeDamich, supra note 106, at 662. 
ll2 See id. at 662-63. 
113 Seeid. 
ll4 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Art and the Law: Suppression and Liberty, 19 CARDozo ARTs & 
ENT. LJ. 9, 10 (2001). 
ll5 Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 94, at 2853. 
ll6 See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 37-39. 
117 See Ginsburg, supra note 114, at 10-11. 
us JoYCE, supra note 26, at 38. 
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U.C.C., and the late 1980's, the advantages of U.S. membership in the 
Berne Convention became increasingly evident.119 The United States 
had become the world leader in the exportation of copyrighted works 
and thus had a strong interest in doing whatever it could to limit the 
market of international piracy jeopardizing U.S. copyright holders' 
creations.l2° Further, the United States, by that time, had both re-
moved itself from UNESCO and withdrawn its U.C.C. membership.121 
Moreover, many U.S. trading partners were members of the Berne 
Convention.122 The Untied States had grown into a major intellectual 
property player, and U.S. entry into the Berne Union seemed to be 
the only way both to cultivate these relationships and to continue 
American influence in the copyright arena.l23 
Before U.S. entry into the Berne Union, U.S. copyright holders 
had to utilize the Berne Convention's so-called "back door" provision 
in order to gain international protection for their works.124 Through 
this "back door to Berne," U.S. authors or copyright holders could 
ensure cop}Tight protection individually in each country in which 
they desired protection.125 Copyright owners had to meet each coun-
try's specific requirements for protection-an onerous burden that 
presented cost concerns and increased risks to copyright holders. 126 
The procedures were costly because of the expense of creating and 
submitting separate applications for each target country.l27 They were 
also risky because an applicant could fail to understand each coun-
try's requirements and thus ultimately fail to gain protection.128 U.S. 
entry into the Berne Convention meant that American authors and 
copyright owners no longer had to rely on this "back door" proce-
dure-those seeking protection for their works could rely on each 
member country of the Berne Union to recognize the copyright 
holders' rights in his or her property through only one general appli-
cation procedure.l29 
119 /d. at 38-39. 
120 ld. at 39. 
121 /d. 
122 Id. 
123 Sec JoYcE, supra note 26, at 39. 
124 ld. 
125 ld. at 36. 
126 Sec id. 
127 ld. 
128 JoYcE, supra note 26, at 36 
129 Sec id. at 33. 
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In 1990, Congress again amended the 1976 Act, explicitly grant-
ing limited "rights of attribution and integrity" to certain types of art-
ists and their works,l30 The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA),I31 en-
acted in 1990, grants authors of ''works of visual art" the right "to 
prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation or other modification" 
of those works.132 VARA's problem lies in its restrictiveness: it grants 
protection only to those artists whose works are included within 
VARA's narrow definition of "works of visual art."133 As such, VARA 
protects only a work's physical original and thus fails to protect later 
representations or derivations of the art image.134 As Professor Gins-
burg points out, "real" moral rights do much more than just safeguard 
the "alteration of the original physical object;" "real" moral rights also 
guard against "distortion of representations of the art image. "135 
In 1994, the United States continued to work on its international 
copyright relations, implementing the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and joining in the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI).136 In 
December 1994, Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act (URAA), by which (among other things) large numbers of foreign 
works in the U.S. public domain were granted retroactive protec-
tion.I37 . 
On October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act (Copyright Term Extension Act), an 
act that lengthens (for the fourth time in the history of U.S. copyright 
law) the duration of copyright protection.l38 With the enactment of 
the Copyright Term Extension Act, U.S. law now mirrors EU law with 
130 Id. at 637. 
m See Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 106(a), 107, 601 (1990). 
132 See id. § 106A(a) (3) (B). Note that the right to prevent destruction of works of visual 
art only applies if the work is of "recognized stature" under the Act. I d. 
ISS Id. § 101. 
134 See id. § 106A(c) (3) (stating that integrity rights do not apply to reproductions). 
However, some state moral rights statutes protect images of art works, as well as the physi-
cal originals, from distortion and then the subsequent attribution back to the artist. See, 
e.g., Wojnarowicz v. American Family Assn., 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (construing 
the N.Y. Artists' Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. Cultural Mfairs Law§ 14.03(1) (McKinney's 
Supp. 1990)). 
135 Ginsburg, supra note 114, at 11. 
136 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 107 Stat. 
2057 (1994), 321.L.M. 605 (1993); GATT, supra note 2. 
137 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 101-103, 108 Stat. 
4809 (1994). 
138 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998). 
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respect to copyright duration. 139 The influence of major corporate 
copyright holders notwithstanding,140 the United States had to extend 
the copyright term in order to comply with the already longer term 
recognized by the EU; before the terms were harmonized by the 
Copyright Term Extension Act, U.S. copyright owners were disadvan-
taged in foreign countries vis-a-vis the "rule of the shorter term."14t 
Under this rule, a work with an expired copyright in its home country 
could not enjoy protection in foreign countries, even where the for-
eign countries would provide longer protection under their own 
copyright laws.142 As such, U.S. copyright holders were disadvantaged 
when they could no longer receive protection in foreign countries 
due to the shorter copyright term in the United States.143 Indeed, the 
Copyright Term Extension Act was considered indispensable in order 
to compete effectively in international trade with the Europeans.t44 
II. PRINCIPAL BASES UPON WHICH COPYRIGHT RESTS 
IN THE EU AND IN THE UNITED STATES 
Berne Convention member countries normally manifest their 
recognition of moral rights through statute.145 However, even Berne 
Convention members with similar legal structures do not hold the 
same conceptions on moral rights. 146 Within individual countries, 
scholars, legislators, and judges fail to agree on the interpretations of 
existing statutory and decisional law concerning artists' moral 
rights.l 47 France, Spain, and many other civil law countries are com-
mitted to furnishing rights that are "absolute, personal, and action-
able solely at the author's discretion. "148 In fact, France is generally 
considered the most comprehensive country with respect to the scope 
139 E. Scott Johnson, Law Gives Coppight New Life, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 8, 1999, at C12. The 
EU had already adopted a "life of author plus 70" standard. !d. 
140 See id. It is interesting that the Copyright Term Extension Act lengthened the dura-
tion of many Yaluable copyrighted works due to enter the public domain before the end of 
the twentieth century. Included among these are George and Ira Gershwin's "Fascinating 
Rhythm," George Gershwin's "Rhapsody in Blue," and Disney's "Steamboat Willie" cartoon 
(the first appearance of the Mickey Mouse character) and "Winnie the Pooh." !d. 
141 !d. 
142 /d. 
143 See id. 
144 See Ayers, mpra note 45, at 74. 
145 Jaszi, supra note 38, at 328. 
146Jd. 
147 Sec Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 104, at 97. 
148 Jaszi, mpra note 38, at 328. 
432 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [\'ol. 26:415 
of artists' moral rights.149 Other civil law countries, however, stop short 
of such an express, affirmative commitment to authors' rights.I 50 
Further, such countries as the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Australia have thus far declined to put economic considerations on 
the same level as moral rights.I5I Argentina indirectly grants rights of 
integrity and paternity in its copyright law, requiring that its citizens 
not engage in acts that would alter the attribution of authorship in 
works.I52 Moreover, a more expansive recognition of moral rights, to 
varying extents, can be found in the laws of Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, and Brazil. Each of these coun-
tries can be said to place more emphasis on moral rights than the 
United States currently does.I53 
Copyright in the civil law world is known as "droit d'auteur" in 
France, "derecho de autor" irr Spain, and "Urheberrecht" in Ger-
many-all terms that translate to "author's (or authors') rights."154 In 
contrast, the United States uses the simple, common law term of 
"copyright," and in doing so impliedly relegates the concept of "au-
thors' rights" to a position subordinate to that of economic justifica-
tion.155 
Though the civil law emphasizes "author autonomy and personal 
connectedness" to one's work, U.S. law developed very differently. 156 
Early on, the United States emphasized "economic incentives to pro-
mote the creation of subject matter deemed important to our soci-
ety. "157 The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers Con-
gress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries."158 As such, U.S. copyright 
law prioritizes a conception (indeed, merely an idea) of attaining 
counterpoise: "copyright law, rather than serving to protect authors' 
(natural) rights or property interests, serves to sustain a balance of 
competing private and public interests."159 That is, these private and 
149 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 104, at 97. 
150 Jaszi, supra note 38, at 328. 
151 !d. 
152 !d. 
153 !d. 
154 JoYCE, supra note 26, at 29. 
155 !d. 
156 See Kwall, supra note 4 7, at 21. 
157 See id. at 20. 
158 U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
159 See Ayers, supra note 45, at 66. 
2003] The EU Intemet Copyright Directive 433 
public interests include both those of authors as well as more expan-
sive social, cultural, and economic concerns.I60 
It follows that as U.S. law developed, the concept of copyright 
became concerned centrally with "the work" as opposed to the more 
romantic, civil law concern with the author. 161 Accordingly, when the 
U.S. concept of "the work" completely eclipsed the authorship idea, 
U.S. law turned full throttle toward unapologetically favoring the 
rights of publishers, purchasers, and the general public over those of 
authors.162 
Economic justification for copyright is based on the idea that 
copyrights serve primarily as a major market facilitator and as a 
mechanism for moving existing works to their most efficient, or "high-
est socially valued uses. "163 The market determines how copyright 
property rights are allocated, and in this way society achieves optimal 
efficiency-the balance between the rights of copyright holders and 
the rights of the public.I64 
Throughout history, the United States, like some other common 
law countries, did not recognize moral rights of artists in their 
works.165 Therefore, the implementation ofVARA was a relatively big 
step for the United States in providing greater protection to artists' 
moral rights.I66 As of 1997, at least eleven states had incorporated 
some type of moral rights provisions into their statutes.167 Further, 
even without actual legislation, some U.S. courts have recognized a 
moral rights protection through either or both of two available 
mechanisms: (1) the extension or generous application of common 
160 /d. 
161 See Kwall, supra note 4 7, at 20. 
162 See id. (citing Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Author-
ship, "1991 DuKE LJ. 455, 471 who addresses Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1853) (No. 13,514)). The recognition of "the work" as a legal concept increased the au-
thority of publishers, who could then preside over the work and even exclude the author 
from any measure of control over the work. /d. at 478.Jaszi further discusses the apparent 
increase in U.S. interest in the moral rights doctrine, but notes that the United States still 
largely ignored the author's perspective and concerns. /d. (citing MarciA. Hamilton, Copy-
right at the Supreme Court: A jurisprudence of Deference, 47 .J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 317, 326 
(2000)) (showing Supreme Court rejection of "an author-centered version of the copyright 
law"). 
163 Ayers, supra note 45, at 54 (noting also that such economic justification was largely 
influenced by the Chicago Law and Economics movement). 
164 /d. 
165 Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 104, at 96. 
166 /d. at 97. 
167 /d. (citing generally Thomas Goetzl, California Art Legislation Goes Federal: Progress in 
the Protection ofA.rtists' Rights, 15 HAS'IlNGS Co MM. & ENT. LJ. 893 (1993) ). 
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law rights, or (2) an expansive reading of statutory rights such as the 
Lanham Act of trademark law.l68 
While only recently recognizing any sort of moral rights in copy-
right, the United States proceeded with great hesitation in imple-
menting legislation addressing these rights.l69 Indeed, the United 
States simply did not need such laws to protect its copyright property, 
as "nations that are principally importers rather than exporters have 
little incentive to protect the interests ofproducers."170 Until the latter 
half of the twentieth century, for example, American artists had not 
risen to a level of prominence in the areas of painting and sculp-
ture.l71 Historically, serious American art collectors were interested 
primarily, if not exclusively, in art of foreign origin.l72 Accordingly, it 
was not in U.S. interests to protect such foreign works with American 
legislation. 173 However, as American artists achieved greater promi-
nence, it became more advantageous for the United States to enact 
such legislation.l74 It thus follows that the VARA of the 1990s concen-
trates its protection on painting and sculptural works.175 Economic 
need provided at least partial motivation for U.S. legislation (narrow 
as it is) to recognize moral rights.l76 
Additional motivation might have been less conspicuously eco-
nomic in nature.l 77 U.S. export of products covered by conventional 
copyright-including books, movies, and recordings-also has be-
come much more prevalent.l78 As such, U.S. interest in having foreign 
nations protect copyrights in those works has concomitantly in-
creased.179 The United States likely ratified the Berne Convention be-
cause of its strong interest in having those rights enforced abroad.180 
Additionally, the 1990s VARA may have been seen as a rather benign, 
168 /d. It is still contended that more should be done to protect authorial moral rights. 
/d. (citing Jane Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System, in MoRAL RIGHTS PRoTEc-
TION IN A CoPYRIGHT SYSTEM 18 (Peter Anderson & David Saunders eds., 1992)). 
169 See id. 
170 Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 104, at 142. 
171 /d. 
172 /d. 
173 /d. 
174 /d. 
175 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 104, at 97, 142. 
176 See id. at 142. 
177 /d. 
178 See id. 
179 /d. 
ISO See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 104, at 142. 
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narrow, and limited measure toward showing "good faith compliance" 
with the standards of the Berne Convention. IS! 
III. THE EU ENVISIONS THE HARMONIZATION oF CoPYRIGHT 
LAw AND POLICY BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT's INTERNET CoPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE 
A. The EU Drives Toward Ever-Increasing World Trading Prominence 
vis-a-vis a Pan-European Approach 
With all of this as background, trade between the United States 
and the EU now flourishes and constitutes a major part of world busi-
ness.182 As trading partners, the two entities enjoy similar "size, pros-
perity, and outlook."183 Further, the internet continues to cultivate 
explosive trade between the EU and the United States.l84 Moreover, 
the EU is a rapidly expanding playing field for all types of e-
commerce transactions. 185 Revenues from e-commerce will likely ex-
ceed $300 billion by the year 2003.186 
While EU member states are expected to act in accordance with 
EU legislation, EU law will not preempt national lawmaking, and 
therefore member states retain their own domestic legislative charac-
ters.l87 EU laws in this area have always been "directives," and thus 
they do not become effective until the member states implement their 
own respective legislation.188 An EU Directive focuses on a specific 
matter and sets forth recommended action with regard to that mat-
ter.189 Often, member states have significant flexibility as to how 
closely domestic legislation meets with the provisions of the Direc-
tive.I90 Member states are usually allotted a two-year period to irnple-
men t appropriate legislation.l91 
181 /d. 
182 Mark Owen, International Ramifications of Doing Business On-Line: Europe, in FouRTH 
ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INS'nTUTE (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. 
Course, Handbook Series, 2001), available at 661 PLI/PAT 627, 635 (2001 ). 
183 /d. 
184 /d. 
185 !d. 
186 !d. 
187 Lipton, supra note 15, at 335. 
188 Owen, supra note 182, at 636. 
189 Lipton, supra note 15, at 336. 
190 !d. 
191 /d. 
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In response to this growing trade industry largely fueled by the 
internet, European lawmakers have begun to focus on e-commerce 
issues.192 However, while the EU works toward "pan-European har-
monization," each member state's laws remain in effect. 193 Thus, any 
given individual country's approach may remain distinct from that 
approach taken on the level of either the United States or the EU as a 
whole. 194 
B. The EU Copyright Directive: Its Short Past, Its Future, and Why It Should 
Be Adopted Without Undue Delay by Member States 
In 1996, after a series of hearings in Brussels and Florence, the 
European Commission (Commission) announced that copyright 
harmonization must become and remain a priority for the EU.195 On 
July 27, 1995, the Commission issued the exhaustive Green Paper on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (Green Pa-
per)196_a document which, in the words of Single Market Commis-
sioner Mario Monti, was meant to "contribute to a wide debate with 
all interested parties on the identification of a clear, stable and coher-
ent regulatory framework for the development of the information 
society. "197 
One major issue the drafters of the Green Paper addressed was 
whether the present status of copyright harmonization, at the single 
market, EU-wide level, was adequate to meet the rapidly increasing 
demands of the digital revolution. 198 As far as the EU was concerned, 
the main difficulty created by the worldwide cyber market of the 
internet was (and, many believe, still is) "the danger of fragmentation 
of the Single Market as a consequence of a lack of harmonization be-
tween member states. "199 
The Copyright Directive requires member states to harmonize 
their laws concerning the reproduction right, the right of communi-
192 Owen, supra note 182, at 635-36. 
193 !d. 
194 !d. 
195 Virginie L. Parant, Copyright Harmonization in the European Union: The Digital A.libi, 16 
ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 22, 32 (1998). 
196 Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society: Green Paper from the 
European Commission to the European Council, COM (95) 382, available at http:/ /europa. 
eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124152.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Copyright 
and Related Rights]. 
197 Parant, supra note 195, at 22 (citing Copyright and Related Rights). 
198 !d. 
199 !d. 
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cation to the public, the distribution right, and technological meas-
ures against circumvention of copyright management and protection 
systems.200 Article One outlines the intended scope of the Directive.2o1 
Article Two sets forth a broad, comprehensive definition of the re-
production right, covering all relevant acts of reproduction, on-line or 
off-line, in material or immaterial form.2o2 
Article Three aims to achieve harmonization of the member 
states' laws concerning the right of communication to the public, 
providing a broad, comprehensive definition of "communications to 
the public" that addresses the interactive nature of the digital envi-
ronment.203 Article Four seeks to achieve harmonization of the right 
of distribution for all types of works where this has not yet been 
done,204 and Article Five sets out exceptions to the rights set forth in 
Articles One through Four.205 
Articles Six and Seven address the protection of technological 
measures and rights-management information.206 Article Six sets forth 
member states' obligations as to technological measures,207 and Arti-
. 2oo Sec generally, Copyright Directive, supra note 12. 
201 /d. art. 1. 
202 /d. art. 2. Pursuant to Article 2: 
Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit 
direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and 
in any form, in whole or in part: (a) for authors, of their works; (b) for per-
formers, of fixations of their performances; (c) for phonogram producers, of 
their phonograms; (d) for the producers of the first fixation of films, in re-
spect of the original and copies of their films; (e) for broadcasting organiza-
tions, of fixations of their broadcasts, whether those broadcasts are transmit-
ted by wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite. 
/d. art. 2. 
203 /d. art. 3. Article 3 states: 
Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorize or 
prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
\11ay that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. 
/d. art. 3. 
2°4 /d. art. 4. Article 4 states: "Member States shall provide for authors, in respect of the 
original of their works or of copies thereof, the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit any 
form of distribution to the public by sale or otherwise." /d. art. 4. 
2os Copyright Directive, supra note 12, art. 5. 
2°6 /d. arts. 6, 7. 
207 /d. art. 6. 
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de Seven addresses member states' obligations concerning rights-
management information.2os 
On February 14, 2001, the European Parliament formally 
adopted the European Copyright Directive.2°9 The Copyright Direc-
tive seeks to solidity the existence of an EU-wide "internal market in 
copyright and related rights," emphasizes e-commerce, and creates a 
legislative framework that will be able to handle the impending chal-
lenges of the digital revolution.21o 
Accordingly, swift adoption of the proposed Directive is crucial to 
ensure a Community-wide market in copyright with a particular focus 
on new products, technology, and services. Further, the adequate pro-
tection of intellectual property will foster creativity and innovation 
and enhance the availability and public acceptance of new services. 
Ultimately, adoption of the Directive will advance the goal of mean-
ingful harmonization while maintaining a balance between all the 
rights and interests involved. 
IV. INCREASED LEVELS oF EU CoPYRIGHT HARMONIZATION WILL 
LEAD TO GREATER GLOBAL HARMONIZATION AS THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EU STRIVE TowARD AcHIEVING 
CoMPLEMENTARY CoPYRIGHT LAw AND PoLicY 
E-commerce and the digital revolution necessitate an integrated 
approach. Global e-commerce was a hot topic at the WIPO Confer-
ence in December 1996: members of national governments, compa-
nies, and nongovernmental agencies met in order to amend the 
Berne Convention with respect to copyright rights in an ever-
changing and increasingly electronic world. 211 Instant, interactive, and 
digitized global communication had begun to speed up not only 
business and trade transactions, but also domestic and international 
communications in general,212 
However, the digital revolution has also made it possible to "pi-
rate digitized music, films, and software" repeatedly, while maintain-
ing the quality of the original.213 Distribution has become much 
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quicker and easier, but unfortunately so has piracy.214 Indeed, the 
internet and e-commerce allow for a wholly different type of product 
distribution from what business and trade knew before the advent of 
the internet.215 Such a "paradigm-shift in product distribution," while 
exciting from the perspective of the businesses and economies of the 
different nations, challenges conventional methods of information 
technology and the copyright system as a whole.216 
At a vv1PO-sponsored Intellectual Property and Technology con-
ference in Cambridge, Massachusetts in April, 1993, the following 
special characteristics of the digital revolution were pronounced: 
a) digital material is intangible until it is processed and pro-
jected through a microprocessor-controlled device; b) it can 
be copied repeatedly with no loss of quality; c) the way in-
formation is conveyed is flexible, as it can be combined, al-
tered, mixed, and manipulated relatively easily; d) digital 
media has an indefinite life because it will not decay as time 
passes.217 
Consumers of copyrighted works are now better able to control 
where and how copyrighted works materialize.218 Works can be 
printed out and e-mailed with relative ease and across international 
borders.219 Communication is essentially instantaneous.22o Where na-
tional borders once slowed down communication and business trans-
actions, the digital revolution has created domestic and foreign mar-
kets that have become identical for all practical purposes.221 Indeed, 
"the ability of a single nation-state to implement autonomous cultural 
and information policies is diminishing; national policymakers need 
the cooperation of other nations if they wish to realize a particular 
goal (such as to ensure a secure environment for the creation and dis-
tribution of copyrighted works). "222 
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The EU and the United States will, by necessity if not by simple 
common sense, work together to create a harmonized market-a 
market better suited to continued trade during the digital revolution. 
U.S. copyright law is already affected by international considera-
tions.223 As trade between the EU and the United States continues to 
flourish, such international considerations will only become more 
important to domestic courts and legislators.224 
Consider the brief filed by the federal government in the recent 
case of Eldred Press v. Reno, a case that challenged the constitutionality 
of the Copyright Term Extension Act.225 The government, advocating 
that the Copyright Term Extension Act passed muster under the U.S. 
Constitution, argued that the constitutional purpose of promoting the 
progress of science and the useful arts was advanced logically by the 
grant of twenty extra years of protection to existing works.226 
Such furtherance of constitutional purpose, the government ar-
gued, is brought about because the amendment brings U.S. law more 
into cohesion with the laws of the EU .227 The Court in this case did 
not actually reach that argument in upholding the constitutionality of 
the Copyright Term Extension Act,22s but in bringing up this point, 
the government recognized the emerging fact that international ii"l:te-
gration is an important aspect of U.S. copyright law.229 
CONCLUSION 
Even though internationalization has not been a U.S. priority in 
the past, it becomes increasingly necessary with the digital revolution. 
Trade between the EU and the United States is central to the econo-
mies of both entities, and requires harmonization in order to operate 
efficiently. Therefore, in the economic interest of both trading blocks, 
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the EU and the United States will move toward harmonization that far 
surpasses even that envisioned by the EU Copyright Directive.230 
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